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Eschatology confronts us with a long list of problems. Clearly, the issue of 
temporality is one of these. How are we to conceive of time in the eschaton? How 
can we reconcile the biblical witness and church tradition with various 
philosophical accounts of temporality? This paper will demonstrate how Henri 
Bergson‟s philosophical notion of duration is applicable to theological discourse. I 
will accomplish this by (1) placing Bergson within the theological and 
philosophical tradition of Augustine and Kant, (2) comparing Bergson to two of his 
contemporaries, Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein, and (3) by describing 
Bergson‟s notion of duration. Throughout the paper, one will find mention of the 
phrases “the kingdom of heaven”/“the reign of God” and a discussion of how this 
may be understood in light of Bergson‟s theory. In conclusion, we will see that 
Bergson‟s duration offers a remedy to many of the ambiguities surrounding 
temporality and the eschaton. 
We often symbolize time as an hourglass or clock. “It is not easy,” writes 
Bergson, “to escape the image of the hour-glass.”1 The common way people 
conceive of time is by spatializing it.
2
 In doing so, we lose sight of what time 
actually is. This becomes highly problematic for theological discussions of eternal 
life. I think it would be safe to claim that heaven is not merely “a really long time.” 
For Bergson, “Real duration is what we have always called time.”3 Later, the 
notion of duration will be discussed at length. For now, let us focus on the common 
way of conceiving time. In Time and Free Will, Bergson states, “The time which 
the astronomer [or physicist or mathematician] introduces into his formulae, the 
time which our clocks divide into equal portions, this time, at least, is something 
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different [from real duration].”4 The common way one thinks of time is as 
movement over space, e.g., the movement of the earth around the sun or the hands 
on a clock. Zeno and the Eleatic philosophers found this to be a paradox. Zeno 
considered a scenario in which Achilles and a tortoise run a race in which the 
tortoise is given a head start. Of course, one‟s experience would testify to the fact 
that Achilles, or any able human person, would inevitably catch up and surpass the 
tortoise. If time is a series of instants/presents/nows, then how can Achilles ever 
catch up to win? Numerical (clock) time cannot account for this. Zeno‟s point is 
that Achilles would never reach the tortoise. Each step taken by the tortoise is one 
more ahead of Achilles. It is by confusing time with space that we arrive at Zeno‟s 
paradox. In Bergson‟s corrective to this, we also find a creative way in which we 
can understand the nature of reality and existence. This creative way, Bergson‟s 
account of duration, may help us understand temporality in the eschaton. First, let 
us turn to two of Bergson‟s historical predecessors. 
 
AUGUSTINE 
In Confessions XI, Augustine raises the question of temporality in relation to 
creation. He first describes God as uniquely different from all created entities, 
which are in time. He writes, “It is not in time that You are before all time: 
otherwise You would not be before all time.”5 There was no time before God 
created the world. God exists in “ever-present eternity.” Claiming that time was 
established synchronically with the material world, Augustine asserts that 
temporality is characteristic of creation and not of the divine.  
He then raises the more difficult question of what time actually is: “If 
nothing passed there would be no past time; if nothing were approaching, there 
would be no future time; if nothing were, there would be no present time.”6 How 
can one conceive of the past and future as real if neither exist in the present? The 
past is no longer now and future has not yet come to be now. Even the present 
fades into the past and is directed toward non-existence. True to the human 
experience, Augustine admits that one may speak of past and future in terms of 
duration—the central focus of Bergson‟s concept of time—but not the present, 
which is always instantaneous as a discrete moment. Yet, if past and future do not 
exist in themselves, where can they be said to exist? 
Augustine reconciles the existence of past, present, and future by placing all 
three times within the present. Each time exists only in the present as “a present of 
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things past, a present of things present, [and] a present of things future.”7 On the 
one hand, we attempt to measure the “length” of time. On the other, we cannot 
measure that which no longer exists or that which is not yet. The aporia of time is 
corrected in two stages. One, time is not the movement of entities over an extended 
space and, therefore, refuses to be measured empirically. Two, time is a mental 
construction experienced in the present and the measurement of time is rather the 
measurement of impressions of things passing through the mind in the present. The 
latter point is an important contribution to the development of philosophical 
accounts of time as a mental construct or intuition, e.g., as found in Kant‟s account 
of temporality. 
 
KANT 
 Like Augustine, Kant places temporality within human consciousness. This, 
of course, is done with modification. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims 
that time “is not an empirical conception” nor is it a “discursive or, as it is called, 
general conception, but a pure form of the sensuous intuition.”8 Time is the 
necessary condition for the possibility of experience. His exposition of time 
accomplishes two objectives—one negative and the other positive. Kant wants to 
distance himself from Newtonian and Leibnizian views of time. Both understand 
one‟s knowledge of time to depend upon one‟s experience of external entities. 
While both Newton and Leibniz assert that time itself is independent of the human 
perceiver, Newtonian time has no observable properties in itself and Leibnizian 
time is merely one type of relation between entities. Kant rejects both views on the 
grounds that they propose time to be real in itself and fail to account for the a 
priori conditions for experience. 
 Kant‟s positive description of time describes time as “a necessary 
representation, lying at the foundation of all our intuitions.”9 In other words, time 
is a pure intuition that is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. 
Time is not found solely within a particular experience; rather, it is already in the 
mind of the perceiver prior to any such experience. It is that which allows for any 
experience to be existentially possible. Time is already presupposed in an 
experience in order to allow for one to grasp relations such as “at the same time” or 
“succeeding in time.”  
From his exposition, Kant draws the following three conclusions: 
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1. Time is not something which subsists in itself, or which 
inheres in things as an objective determination, and therefore 
remains, when abstraction is made of the subjective 
conditions of the intuition of things. 
2. Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that 
is, of the intuitions of self and of our internal state. For time 
cannot be any determination of outward phenomena. 
3. Time is the formal condition a priori of all phenomena 
whatsoever.
10
 
 
Kant‟s conclusions reveal an interpretation of time as a subjective and formal 
condition for human experience. Consequently, it would be faulty to describe 
entities as “being in time” since transcendentally ideal time is not real in itself or a 
quality of things independent of human consciousness. 
The reader should note, for our present purpose, that both Augustine and 
Kant characterize time in relation to human consciousness. According to them, 
time is not an entity itself nor is it reducible to the level of physical properties. It 
cannot be reduced to space, which is the common way of understanding time, i.e., 
the movement of objects traversing space from one point to another. It fails to 
understand the reality of relativity as given in physics, the evolutionary 
development of the world, and the human experience of change.  
 
TWO OF BERGSON’S CONTEMPORARIES 
 In the early twentieth century, proponents of non-spatial accounts of time 
understood temporality in light of either logical positivism and mathematics or 
quantum physics. Bertrand Russell, one of the leading positivists and 
mathematicians of the time, claimed that change “over time” can only be 
understood objectively through mathematics. Continuity cannot be thought 
metaphysically but only logically. In Our Knowledge of the External World, 
Russell claims that change is “instants without duration.”11 However much two 
instants appear to be in succession, there exists an infinite amount of fractions 
between them. This is not to claim that Russell denies continuity, merely that 
continuity is a property belonging to the order of entities in the world in so far as 
logical analysis asserts the ordering. Russell‟s positivism leads him to conclude 
that time is not inherent in objects themselves but is inherent in the logical ordering 
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of objects. In other words, what one considers to be time is empirically 
experienced as a consequence of logical analysis. 
 In Physics, Albert Einstein‟s theory of relativity opened up news ways of 
understanding time.
12
 Like the aforementioned, Einstein claims that time does not 
exist in itself. At the same time, Einstein retains the notion of the instant. What is 
relative is the simultaneity of instants. Gilles Deleuze notes Bergson‟s summary of 
Einstein‟s theory as “everything begins from a certain idea of movement that 
entails a contraction of bodies and a dilation of their time.”13 One philosophical 
critique of Einstein is that his notion of the relativity of multiple times implies a 
single unified time by which this plurality is measured. While physics attempts to 
measure the relative plurality of instants, it fails to account the duration of time. 
This is the point of departure for Bergson.
14
 In Bergson‟s account, duration escapes 
being subject to mathematical investigation. 
 
BERGSON 
Although Bergson was a major figure in the beginning of the last century, 
his philosophy was ignored in the wake of logical positivism and phenomenology. 
However, with the rise in studies on Gilles Deleuze, who was a scholar of 
Bergsonism, Bergson‟s philosophy regained subtle importance. Today, few major 
contemporary philosophers, e.g., Keith Ansell Pearson and Leonard Lawlor, are in 
dialogue with Bergson‟s corpus and often place him among philosophers such as 
Spinoza and Nietzsche. What are presently taken as his two major philosophical 
contributions are his conception of time as duration and his distinction between 
continuous multiplicity and discrete multiplicity. Continuous multiplicity implies 
duration and change. Discrete multiplicity is understood as a discontinuous, static 
series. 
The common way one conceives time is to think of it as a homogenous 
medium, as a linear progression of static points or presents. We derive the 
conception of time from the spatial arrangement of objects and the movement of 
objects from one point to another. For Bergson, however, time cannot be reduced 
to space; “as soon as we try to measure it, we unwittingly replace it by space.”15 To 
think spatially is not to properly think duration. “The challenge of Bergsonism,” 
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according to Lawlor, “is to think in terms of duration.”16 The present essay will 
focus on the development of Bergson‟s key concept—duration—in order to meet 
this challenge. 
The human perceiver does not have access to the instant/present/now as 
such. Rather, one has access to the intensity of that which is experienced in 
duration. The mental states that are exhibited in an experience affect the way in 
which the duration is perceived. One‟s mood or attunement conditions one‟s 
everyday experiences. For example, she who is happy to be with her loved one will 
find that “time flies” when the two are together. A bored student will feel as if an 
average lecture “lasted for hours.” No doubt, people are aware that some 
experiences feel longer or shorter than others; yet, when questioned, they will 
appeal to the mathematical time of homogenous, discrete instants. This, in turn, 
fails to account for the qualitative nature of experience that leads one to describe 
her or his experience by using expressions such as “time flies.” 
“Time and change,” according to Paul Tillich, “are present in the depth of 
Eternal Life, but they are contained within the eternal unity of the Divine Life.”17 
Jesus, no doubt, understood this qualitative aspect of experience. While speaking 
of the kingdom of heaven, Jesus uses loose similes. On the one hand, the kingdom 
has its basis in the divine. On the other, the kingdom is experienced on an 
individual level with varying intensities of affect. Luke 17:20 records Jesus saying, 
“The coming of the reign of God cannot be observed, and no one will announce, 
„Look, here it is,‟ or, „There it is.‟ For behold, the reign of God is among you.”18 
The portraits of the kingdom as already actualized lend credence to the qualitative 
intensity. Experiences of the kingdom may be found in a multiplicity, e.g., in 
repentance or in feeding the poor.
19
 The affect (and existence) of this kingdom 
cannot be measured qualitatively. 
In Time and Free Will, Bergson criticizes the spatializing of temporality. 
Proponents of the common way reduce time to space by emphasizing extension 
and succession. We plot our mental states as points on a line in order to 
contemplate on them simultaneously. To do this, however, makes impossible the 
ability to think of these points as discrete and successive. Bergson provides two 
illustrations to make his point. In the first, he describes the movement of his finger 
over a surface. This experience is filled with a series of various qualities. He 
writes: 
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 One of two things happens: either I picture these sensations to 
myself as in duration only, and in that case they succeed one 
another in such a way that I cannot at a given moment perceive 
a number of them as simultaneous and yet distinct; or else I 
make out an order of succession, but in that case I display the 
faculty not only of perceiving a succession of elements, but also 
of setting them out in line after having distinguished them.
20
 
 
In his second illustration, Bergson contrasts duration with the swinging of a 
pendulum.
21
 For each second, the pendulum completes one oscillation. One 
minute, or sixty seconds, equals sixty oscillations. Bergson notes the impossibility 
of having one mental perception of all sixty oscillations at one moment and having 
this same perception include the idea of succession. This would be possible (as an 
abstraction) only by representing one oscillation by one point on a line. One 
minute is then reduced in representation as sixty points on a line, which denies the 
pure qualitative aspect of temporality. 
It can then be said that a representation of space is implied in an order of 
succession. Consequently, to define time by space is merely symbolic. One cannot 
think of the series simultaneously and distinctly because to think of these instants 
together is to ignore the varying quality of sensations. Indeed, duration itself is 
wholly qualitative. Mental states fluidly mix together and cannot be investigated in 
their singularity; they have no definitive lines between them to signal the 
completion of one state and the beginning of another. 
Bergson often contrasts his notion of duration with the paradoxes of Zeno, in 
which time is reduced to the movement of entity from one position to another.
22
 
Motion contains the following two elements: (1) the homogenous, divisible space 
that is traversed and (2) the indivisible, consciously real act of traversing. “The 
mistake of the Eleatics,” according to Bergson, “arises from their identification of 
this series of acts, each of which is of a definite kind and indivisible, with the 
homogenous space which underlies them.”23 While space is infinitely divisible as 
extension, it would be a mistake to equate two simultaneous positions in space 
with the movement of entities as acts.  
The movements themselves, which are qualitative, do not occupy space. The 
common way one understands time is in terms of motion: the seconds on a clock, 
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the orbit of the earth around the sun, or the arrow flying through the air. The 
reduction of time to motion and, therefore, space is the same mistake as that of 
Zeno and the Eleatics. Bergson‟s criticism runs as follows: 
 
1. The space between two points is infinitely divisible into an 
infinite amount of intervals. 
2. Movement is formed by the aggregate of intervals. 
3. Therefore, the traversing of intervals becomes impossible. 
 
Bergson‟s corrective is to understand the movement from one position to another 
as a mental synthesis. While it appears that Bergson claims that duration is not 
divisible, he is in fact claiming that “duration divides up and does so constantly.”24 
This multiplicity is, for Bergson, continuous and not discrete. Deleuze writes, 
“That is why it is a multiplicity. But it does not divide up without changing in kind, 
it changes in kind in the process of dividing up: This is why it is a non-numerical 
multiplicity, where we can speak of „indivisibles‟ at each stage of the division.”25 
Duration, for Bergson, is a non-numerical, virtual multiplicity. 
 In Time and Free Will, Bergson claims that this virtual multiplicity exists in 
human consciousness, which places him in proximity to Augustine and Kant. 
However, unlike Kant, who grasps time as succession, Bergson understands the 
present as the co-existence of past and present. He states:  
 
The interval of duration exists only for us and on account of the 
interpenetration of our conscious states. Outside ourselves we 
should find only space, and consequently nothing but 
simultaneities, of which we could not even say that they are 
objectively successive, since succession can only be thought 
through comparing present with the past.
26
 
 
No mental state exists that is not continually changing. This is so because 
consciousness is formed by memory, which, when added to a mental state, 
qualitatively changes the mental state into something different. This is why 
Deleuze characterizes Bergson‟s duration as a non-numerical multiplicity—a 
multiplicity that is constantly changing into another “indivisible.” Explaining how 
the past persists in the present, Bergson writes: 
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Inner duration is the continuous life of a memory which 
prolongs the past into the present, whether the present distinctly 
contains the ever-growing image of the past, or whether, by its 
continual changing of quality, it attests rather the increasingly 
heavy burden dragged along behind one the older one grows. 
Without that survival of the past in the present there would be 
no duration but only instantaneity.
27
 
 
Duration, therefore, exists only in consciousness: “Multiplicity is real only for a 
consciousness.”28 Bergson later found ascribing duration and virtual multiplicity 
solely to consciousness was problematic for it did not account for the relationship 
between matter and memory and failed to account for evolutionary change.
29
 
 One finds in Bergson‟s Matter and Memory an overcoming of Cartesian 
dualism. In his second major text, Bergson claims that the present, which is 
sensori-motor, is a perception of the past and a determination of the future. 
Subsequently, matter is “a present which is always beginning again [as] our present 
is the very materiality of our existence.”30 The present is understood as one‟s 
holistic attitude, by which I mean both conscious and material since neither are 
determinate nor divisible according to Bergson. This may have significance in 
developing a hybrid between Hebraic and Greek concepts of personhood. Greek 
analytic anthropology describes the human person in dualistic terms of body and 
soul, i.e., Platonism. The Christian appropriation of this dualism has led to many of 
the shortcomings of Christian philosophy/theology. In order to twist free of this 
Platonism, one may turn back to the synthetic anthropology of Hebraic theology. 
According to this view, the human person is one of flesh, life, and spirit. Unlike 
Platonism, the Hebrew anthropology is not suggesting that the human person 
consist of divisible different parts. Rather, an indivisible holism is being proposed.  
The indivisibility of matter and memory is further discussed in Creative 
Evolution. For now, we should recall the fundamental idea of cell development. 
The cells within one‟s body are ceaselessly changing. Even the miniscule atoms 
that compose the world are constantly in motion themselves. While an object may 
appear to be at rest, it is continually undergoing change. Imagine the following 
experiment. A person stares at a sheet of paper for three minutes. Did the paper 
change? The person responds in the negative. However, this person accepts the 
idea that the paper will deteriorate over centuries. This would be true even if the 
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paper were to remain in the same spatial position for many centuries. The negative 
response given initially was based on confusing duration and change with space. 
 Returning to the question of movement, Bergson again claims that motion is 
indivisible and that real instants are impossible. Instants exist only as 
heterogenous, non-numerical duration. The pure multiplicity found within duration 
(as duration) is that by which body and mind become epistemologically distinct. At 
the same time, there is a unity of the conscious subject. Deleuze describes 
Bergsonian duration as “duration, tendency is the difference of self from self; and 
what differs from itself is immediately the unity of substance and subject.”31 In 
other words, the two are distinguished by time and not space. “You define the 
present,” he states, “in an arbitrary manner as that which is, whereas the present is 
simply what is being made. Nothing is less than the present moment.”32 Human 
existence is immanently manifest in change, in duration; the human is becoming. 
The question of whether or not duration is characteristic of non-human entities 
remains ambiguous. It is not until Creative Evolution that Bergson provides an 
ontology of duration. 
 In Creative Evolution, Bergson describes duration as immanent to the 
world—a world that is itself living and conscious. The evolutionary whole of life is 
understood here as a qualitative, virtual multiplicity. On this point, Creative 
Evolution is best seen as a work in philosophy and not biology. The sciences only 
observe abstracted isolated wholes and, therefore, cannot account for the 
endurance of the universe as holistic and concrete. “Life,” writes Bergson, “is no 
more made of physico-chemical elements than a curve is composed of straight 
lines.”33 Life occurs within an open system and along actualized divergent lines 
within “an indivisible continuity.”34 In other words, life is not arranged along a 
straight outline; rather, (the whole of) life is marked by its fluidity, by multiplicity.  
Like the evolution of life, the kingdom of heaven has a creative growth. The 
Gospels testify to this on a few occasions; e.g., the kingdom is like a mustard 
seed.
35
 Like yeast permeating through dough, the kingdom of heaven spreads 
throughout the world.
36
 These illustrations reveal the organic, evolutionary nature 
of God‟s kingdom. This is a reign of freedom and choice, not coercion and 
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necessity. The reign of God is one of infinite love. It cannot be divided into a 
numerical multiplicity for it exists only in its dynamism as pure multiplicity. 
Contra Darwin, Bergson portrays the evolution of life as creative and not 
mechanistic. His ontology of duration is as follows: “Duration means invention, 
the creation of forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new.”37 In Time 
and Free Will, Bergson posits duration with psychological experience. However, 
later, in Creative Evolution, he posits duration as existence. He writes, “We are 
continually creating ourselves…to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to 
mature is to go on creating oneself endlessly.”38 Bergson extends his notion of 
duration to apply to all other living organisms.
39
 Entities that are external to human 
consciousness endure (change) without the determinations of human mental states. 
In other words, duration is not something we intuit onto other entities. Rather, to 
summarize Creative Evolution, duration is change. Change is life. Life is existence. 
 In his fashion, Bergson returns to the theme of temporality. Criticizing 
numerical and spatial description of time, he writes, “There is no instant 
immediately before another instant; there could not be, any more than there could 
be one mathematical point touching another.”40 The distance between points can 
always be divided, thereby making measurement superfluous. Likewise, the 
evolution of life cannot be accurately understood if grasped in terms of discrete 
forms changing over periods of time. This is true even if these forms are 
characterized by speciation, variation, selection, and adaptation. For Bergson, each 
organism is ceaselessly in a mode of change. My reader has undergone change, 
e.g., physiologically and psychologically, since beginning reading this paper. Even 
while remaining in the same spatial location, the reader has acquired knowledge, 
has had new cellular formations, and has possibly varied in her or his attunement 
toward the present. In evolutionary history, there are no static steps, no discrete 
transitional species. This is why Bergson asserts that “time is invention or it is 
nothing at all.”41 
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 If duration is understood as change, then Bergson‟s “The Perception of 
Change” provides a helpful exposition of temporality. For Bergson, change is 
indivisible, despite the common way of understanding change/duration/ 
temporality. The common way offers an “artificial schema [that] we interpose 
unknowingly between reality and us.”42 This indirect perception of reality through 
the artificial schematic lens is what gives us discrete, mathematical time. The result 
of indirect perception of temporality is clock time.  In Time and Free Will, Bergson 
writes, “When I follow with my eyes on the dial of a clock the movement of the 
hand which corresponds to the oscillations of the pendulum, I do not measure 
duration, as seems to be thought; I merely count simultaneities, which is very 
different.”43 The hand of the pendulum occupies only one position in a space since 
all previous positions are no longer. The clock, therefore, is taken as an illustration 
and not the measuring instrument of temporality. Indeed, pure duration cannot be 
measured. 
Bergson is continuing here his distinction between pure duration and 
mathematical (clock) time. Duration is continuous, indivisible time; it cannot be 
reduced to mathematical quantificiation. Quantitative time is measurable 
“duration,” which is divided into (spatialized) units. Attempting to measure time—
what would be abstractions of time—results in discontinuity. Bergson‟s duration is 
neither eternity nor a multiplicity of presents or nows. Every experience is 
qualitatively different. Understanding duration as either of these two is to think 
temporality with immobility. 
Bergson further illustrates his point by displaying the movement of his hand 
from point A to point B. The traversing of AB is a simple motion. We hypothesize 
that we could cease moving our hand at any intermediary point. To do this, 
however, would alter the experience and no longer have the same movement. It 
would be two distinct movements. Movement, for Bergson, is indivisible. One 
might respond, “Each movement is divisible. Even if one did not stop at an 
intermediary point, there would still be a division of space and time. You could 
subtract the amount of time that elapsed at the intermediary point and get the total 
amount of time elapsed during the single movement AB.” This response fails to 
see the insight of Creative Evolution; it tries to understand reality in terms of 
immobility, as if each point were always exactly the same. In reality, there is only 
synchronized motion. “Movement is reality itself.”44 All is undergoing ceaseless 
change. 
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 Portraying reality as immobile was the cause of Zeno‟s paradoxes. The 
Eleatics confused indivisible motion with the space traversed. Bergson claims that, 
if we were to ask him, Achilles would make a remarkable statement; 
 
Zeno insists that I [Achilles] go from the point where I am to 
the point the tortoise has left, from that point to the next point it 
has left, etc., etc., that is his procedure for making me run. But I 
go about it otherwise. I take a first step, then a second, and so 
on: finally, after a certain number of steps, I take a last one by 
which I skip ahead of the tortoise. I thus accomplish a series of 
indivisible acts.
45
 
 
The race between Achilles and the tortoise cannot be divided like the space 
through which the race occurred. In Creative Evolution, Bergson claimed that 
“time is invention or it is nothing at all.”46 There is no immobility in reality in so 
far as real existence implies change. Likewise, “If movement is not everything it is 
nothing.”47  
Change, like motion, is indivisible. Although we commonly describe motion 
as a series of points and change as a series of states, we have, in reality, change 
that is synchronic. Bergson describes an object, of which the color changes. As the 
object changes color, one‟s perception of the object changes; as the object changes, 
the perceiver changes. “There is no perception,” according to Bergson, “which is 
not constantly being modified. So that color, outside of us, is mobility itself, and 
our own person is also mobility.”48 At the same time, he admits that “the breaking 
up of change into states enables us to act upon things, and it is useful in a practical 
sense to be interested in states rather than in the change itself.”49 In other words, 
confusing synchronicity with mobility does have practical use; in fact, this is how 
we function in daily life. Bergson sees this problematic only for metaphysics in so 
far as the interest in states focuses on appearances rather than reality. 
 For clarity, Bergson illustrates his point by describing the experience of a 
melody. Although one may focus on the abstraction of a series of notes, one‟s 
hearing of the melody as a whole is a step closer to understanding duration. A 
melody is indivisible. He writes, “There is simply the continuous melody of our 
inner life—a melody which is going on and will go on, indivisible, from the 
beginning to the end of our conscious existence. Our personality is precisely 
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that.”50 Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI uses this same metaphor to describe 
the redeemed: “In their being together as the one Christ, they are heaven. In that 
moment, the whole creation will become song.”51 To break a melody into intervals 
would create two distinctly different melodies even if the notes were arranged in 
the exact order. Christian identity is intrinsically linked to Christ and the 
community of believers. Likewise, our own inner states cannot be divided along 
straight lines. While listening to the entirety of a melody, one experiences a fluid, 
continuous event in the same manner that one reflects on one‟s continual 
consciousness. One cannot divide the qualitative experience into smaller units 
without diminishing the qualitative changes produced by the experience. 
 What, then, can then be said of the present? Bergson‟s concept of the present 
is a significant modification of the Augustinian present. The present is usually 
thought to exist, whereas the past no longer exists and the future has not yet come 
into existence. Adherents to the common way consider the present in mathematical 
terms as an instant analogous to a point on a line. Bergson considers this an 
abstraction with no real existence. “You could never create time out of such 
instants any more than you could make a line out of mathematical points.”52 The 
analogy used in the common way fails to account for the relation between points. 
In between A and B are an infinite amount of other discrete points. By thinking the 
common way, one cannot account for the relation between the points and the 
catalyst by which the immobile becomes mobile. Again, this is due to the 
confusion of time with space. 
 For Augustine, the past and future survive in the present. Bergson asserts 
that the past preserves itself automatically. The present, for Bergson, varies by 
one‟s field of attention. It contains as much to which we give attention.53 He 
writes, “Our present falls back into the past when we cease to attribute to it an 
immediate interest.”54 Moreover, that which had previously transpired still affects 
the present. We are continually being inscribed upon by our past. This so because 
the indivisibility of change is that which allows the past to be preserved in the 
present. What can be said of the nature of the future is far more difficult.  
 
DELEUZE’S PRESENT 
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 Let us now briefly turn to Deleuze‟s portrayal of temporality in The Logic of 
Sense.
55
 Deleuze claims that there are two readings of time: chronos and aion. 
According to chronos, “past, present, and future are not three dimensions of time; 
only the present fills time, whereas past and future are two dimensions relative to 
the present in time.”56 The present absorbs these two dimensions into itself. We 
should recall the accounts of temporality by Augustine and Kant: 
 
Augustine: 
   A. Past: memory in the present. 
   B. Present: direct experience 
   C. Future: anticipation in the present 
  Kant: 
   A. Time and Space are the two forms of intuition. 
B. Time is not a concept. It is an intuition. 
C. It is presupposed in order to discuss relations such as 
“at the same time” or “succeeding time” or change. 
D. Without A Priori time, perception of alteration or 
change is not comprehensible. 
 
Deleuze claims that the present of chronos is “in some manner corporeal. It is the 
time of mixtures.”57 Past and future are excesses within the embodied present. 
These excesses are regulated by the present and are, therefore, subject to 
measurement. The measuring is that of Being, which, in the tradition of Plato, is 
static. The present for a being is, subsequently, that which gives rise to clock 
time.
58
 However, duration must be thought in terms of becoming. 
 According to aion, there is no present as such. Deleuze writes, “Instead of a 
present which absorbs the past and future, a future and past divide the present at 
every instant and subdivide it ad infinitum into past and future, in both directions at 
once.”59 The history of humanity is a record of our past that is always open to the 
future. While we live between the cross and the eschaton, the aionic present is 
conditioned by the meeting of these two events. The kingdom of heaven remains 
mysteriously upon us as “the already” and the awaited “not-yet.” Yet, it is in this 
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present and coming kingdom that we hope.
60
 This hope gives rise to action, 
perpetuating the multiplicity of events. 
Aion is time of the event, of experience. There is a ceaseless rupture 
between past and future that gives rise to that which is called the present. The past 
and future are continually crashing against one another according to various 
intensities that allow for the qualitative nature of duration. “Aion,” according to 
Deleuze, “is the past-future, which in an infinite subdivision of the abstract 
moment endlessly decomposes itself in both directions at once and forever 
sidesteps the present.”61 Consequently, we do not have access to a present as such 
since the abstract moment of the present is a “coming and going” that never exists 
in and for itself. That which we call “present” is the dynamic rupture of 
temporality. Our existence, therefore, is marked by ceaseless change, by an ever-
growing radical altering of the self, in which creative evolution never ceases. 
 
RESOLVING ESCHATOLOGICAL TEMPORALITY 
 In conclusion, I will provide several ways in which Bergson‟s notion of 
duration acts as an aid for conceiving temporality in the eschaton. Since time is 
understood as duration/change/ existence, Bergson would disapprove of describing 
eternal life as timelessness. Timelessness would mean non-existence. One must 
think temporality as duration. In Time and Free Will, one discovers Bergson‟s 
claim that we only have access to the qualitative intensity of duration. Perhaps our 
fellowship with God in eternity bears such great intensity that our existence is 
ceaselessly inscribed by the divine. In heaven, human persons will still be 
characterized by change. Furthermore, the manner in which human persons relate 
to God here and now is continually evolving. Human persons are not God and will 
not reach a static point at which they become God themselves. The identity of God 
and humanity does not radically morph into one whole. Rather, the relation 
between the two remains a relation—one that is dynamic in its becoming. 
 Although this paper does not devote much space to Matter and Memory, it is 
worth noting one significant connection with theology. Bergson asserts that 
perception involves both body and soul.
62
 His depiction of the human person as a 
unity of matter and memory is compatible with biblical witness of resurrected 
bodies. While it may not aid us in understanding an intermediary state, Matter and 
Memory does provide philosophical support for the claims regarding a material, 
physical heaven—the New Jerusalem.63 
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 In Creative Evolution, Bergson describes God as “unceasing life, action, 
freedom.”64 Tillich resolves the quandary of God and temporality as follows: 
 
God is eternal; this is the decisive characteristic of those 
qualities which make him God. He is subjected neither to the 
temporal process nor with it to the structure of finitude. God, as 
eternal has neither the timelessness of absolute identity nor the 
endlessness of mere process. He is „living,‟ which means that 
he has in himself the unity of identity and alteration which 
characterizes life and which is fulfilled in Eternal Life.
65
 
 
Bergson, like Tillich, notes an ontological distinction between God, who “has 
nothing of the already made,” and the created world. In a Heideggerian sense, God 
is the ground of being from which beings arise. The divine spark within humanity 
bears close resemblance to Bergson‟s elan vital. This eternal pulse ceaselessly 
emanates from the divine. Consequently, all of creation is directed toward the 
divine.
66
 This directionality is understood as intentionality, as “beings-towards.” 
For Rahner, this is understood as the “supernatural existential.” His Greek 
counterpart, Christos Yannaras, would describe this as theosis, becoming divine—
an ontological structure and existential process in which we already find ourselves.  
If life is constituted by duration, then eternal life is constituted by a divine 
duration in which past and future continue to clash against one another. John 
Macquarrie writes, “The past event, made present through memory, discloses 
possibilities for decision in the present moment…the future through anticipation, 
prediction, decision.”67 As a consequence, the aionic present is formed out of this 
mixture. The kingdom of heaven is described in a similar fashion as that which will 
be established and that which has already come. This kingdom and humanity are 
already evolving in their relationship. Likewise, the overflowing creativity and 
love of God provides such an intensity of affect that eternal life may easily be 
thought of as union. 
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 Temporality has become problematic in eschatological discourse due to 
conceiving time in the common way. Accounts of mathematical time fail to 
accurately perceive change by grasping temporality as the traversing of positions 
on a plane. This certainly fails to account for eternal life, which is not an endless 
series of static points. Bergson‟s “The Perception of Change” offers a corrective 
from which we can describe temporality in the eschaton. The point here is not to 
deny the spatiality of heaven; rather, it is to shed light on the nature of change.
68
 
Change occurs regardless of traversing space. Bergson‟s account of duration can 
easily be used to describe existence in the heavenly city as well. There should be 
no confusion on this point as long as eternity is not thought of as “a really long 
time.” God, who, according to Bergson, is energy itself, summons all of creation to 
be relationally united with him.
69
 At the same time, we are free to make ourselves 
who we become. The human person is characterized by a “clear and irreversible 
forward orientation.”70 This characteristic, of which the mystics were well aware, 
does not cease in heaven since there are overdeterminations of God. In other 
words, human persons will always be in a state of evolving with the divine. There 
will always be something of the divine that is beyond our grasp. While certain 
matters of eschatology escape human certainty, we can in fact hope for a future in 
which all are united with God. 
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